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International Accounting in Light of Enron:
Evidence from Empirical Research
Mark H. Lang*

Introduction
Recent accounting scandals in the United States may suggest
that U.S. reporting is fundamentally flawed and that other systems
might be preferable. However, I believe that conclusion would
ignore the substantial body of empirical research that could
provide insight on the relative effectiveness of the U.S. financial
reporting system. My goal in this paper is to examine how the
evidence from this empirical research bears on understanding the
current state of international accounting development and its
prospects for the future. In particular, I focus on the evidence
related to the quality of accounting data produced under the U.S.
accounting system relative to that produced under other systems.
My general conclusion is that, based on the weight of the
extant empirical evidence, the U.S. system has produced
accounting data that compare favorably with those produced under
other systems, and that the resulting transparency and credibility
of capital markets has been at least on par with the system of any
other country. 2 Related research on cross-listing suggests that
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symposium on International Accounting Standards in the Wake of Enron and benefited
from the comments of conference participants, Jana Ready, Allison Evans, Laura
Knudson, and Wendy Wilson.
I My goal is not to provide a comprehensive survey of the literature, but to
highlight a few representative recent papers that illustrate the basic results, and to
provide discussion and references to the broader literature.
2 See Christian Leuz, et al., Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An
International Comparison, J. FiN. ECON. (forthcoming 2003), http://jfe.rochester.edu/
02307/pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation); Judy Land & Mark Lang, Empirical
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investors view the decision by non-U.S. firms to list on U.S.
exchanges (thereafter subjecting themselves to U.S. accounting
and regulation) as enhancing their credibility. 3 While Enron raises
questions about specific aspects of the U.S. financial reporting
system, I argue that there is little reason to believe that any other
accounting system would have been more effective in dealing with
these issues. In fact, the ongoing response, both in terms of
legislative changes and penalties for those involved, has the
potential to actually enhance the long-term credibility of the U.S.
system.
Research Literature
My focus is on large-sample empirical research using archival
accounting and stock price data. As with any research approach,
this one has strengths and weaknesses. An advantage of this
approach is that it evaluates data actually reported by firms rather
than speculating about the data that a given accounting system
might report. For example, it is tempting to argue that a
principles-based system requiring conformance with a "true and
fair view" would result in better accounting than a detailed rulesbased system, because the principles-based system would
constrain firms from engineering around bright-line rules.
However, the extent to which such a standard actually constrains
behavior (especially without considering the associated auditing
and enforcement standards) is an empirical question. In addition,
this approach permits inferences based on a large sample of firms
rather than relying on individual examples. While one can
certainly find cases in which the U.S. system has performed
poorly, it is more difficult to argue that other systems are better, or
that the U.S. system has deteriorated, if one cannot find empirical
Evidence on the Evolution of InternationalEarnings,77 ACCT. REV., 115, 115-33 (Supp.
2002); Ray Ball, et al., The Effect of InternationalInstitutionalFactorson Propertiesof
Accounting Earnings, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 1, 1-51 (2000).
3 See Mark Lang, et al., How Representative are Firms that are Cross Listed in the
United States? An Analysis of Accounting Quality, J. ACCT. REs. 1, 1-34 (forthcoming
May 2003); Marco Pagano, et al., The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies
List Abroad?, LVII J. FIN. 2651, 2651-94 (Dec. 2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing
Towards. the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on
International Corporate Governance, 1-87 (Columbia Law School, Working Paper No.
205, May 30, 2002); Darius P. Miller, The Market Reaction to International Crosslistings: Evidence From DepositaryReceipts, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 103-23 (1999).
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evidence in large sample tests.

In terms of limitation, this approach is descriptive rather than
normative. As a result, the goal is to describe differences across
countries rather than to infer which is "best," since that would
require an explicit cataloging of winners and losers across
systems, followed by a weighting of their importance. Second, the
data are historical, and much of the analysis pre-dates the Enron
failure. However, as argued later, more recent papers include
recent data, and some studies have explicitly examined whether
there has been a deterioration of quality over time.4 Third, by its
very nature, this approach is limited to systems that have been
implemented and for which data are available. Several presenters
in this conference suggest alternative accounting approaches that
may be superior but have not yet been implemented in any
country, and therefore cannot be examined empirically. Finally,
this approach cannot separate the effects of accounting standards
from other features of the reporting system, such as enforcement
and attestation. However, it seems more useful to evaluate the
system as a whole rather than to focus on one aspect, like
accounting standards, in isolation.
I consider several primary streams of research: comparisons
across countries,5 cross-listing,6 and comparisons over time.7
Comparisons across countries provide direct insight into the
effects of differences in reporting systems. Cross listing research,
while indirect, provides evidence on how investors and non-U.S.
firms view the credibility of the U.S. system. Finally, time series
comparisons suggest whether the quality of reporting has
deteriorated over time.

4 See Wayne Landsman & Edward Maydew, Has the Information Content of
Annual Earnings Announcements Declined in the Past Three Decades?, 40 J. ACCT. RES.
797, 797-808 (2002); Land & Lang, supra note 1.

5 See Ball, et al., supra note 2; Land & Lang, supra note 2; Leuz, et al., supra note
2.
6 See Coffee, supra note 3; Lang, et al., supra note 3; Miller, supra note 3;
Pagano, et al., supra note 3.
7 See Land & Lang, supra note 2; Landsman & Maydew, supra note 4.
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ComparativeStudies
Many studies rely on categorizations of accounting systems,
8
and then on comparisons within and between accounting systems.
The most typical dichotomy is between the common law and civil
law countries.' While the categorization is crude (and there is an
extensive literature considering other potential characterizations)
the categories are at least useful for structuring thinking about
potential differences.
Because financial accounting is intended primarily to convey
information to the providers of capital, development of accounting
systems is a function of the primary sources of capital. In this
view, common law economies (with the United States being a
primary example) are distinguished by their historic reliance on
diffuse equity ownership as a source of capital, facilitating
separation of ownership and control. That system places greater
information demands on companies for two reasons. First,
individual investors are too small to be able to justify direct
communication and customized information. Similarly, investors
are typically diversified so even if they could communicate
directly, it would be costly for them to deal with individual firms.
As a result, financial accounting has developed as a primary
communication mechanism to provide relatively standardized,
comparable data across firms. Given the importance of individual
investors to the capital markets, substantial resources have been
devoted to developing the accounting system and associated
infrastructure. In the United States, probably more than any other
country, substantial resources are expended on developing
comprehensive
accounting
standards,
auditing financial
statements, enforcing regulation through the SEC, and litigating
violations of accounting standards.
On the other hand, the civil law countries traditionally have
not relied as heavily on diffuse equity ownership. Rather,
ownership often includes large blockholders (sometimes other
corporations or families), bank financing, and, in some cases,
greater governmental involvement. In addition, the stakeholder
8 Ball et al., supra note 2, at 1; Leuz, et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 1, on file
with authors).
9 Ball et al., supra note 2, at 2; Leuz, et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 3-4, on
file with authors).
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model is broader and includes groups such as labor unions. As a
consequence, communication with diffuse equity owners and
minority investor protection has not received as much emphasis.
Fewer resources tend to be devoted to accounting, resulting in less
comprehensive accounting standards, fewer auditors, less
enforcement, and less potential for shareholder litigation. In
addition, financial reporting and tax reporting have traditionally
been more closely aligned, because financial reporting is not
deemed sufficiently important to justify the cost of maintaining
separate records.
The overall conclusion from comparative research is that
common law countries in general, particularly the United States,
produce accounting data that rank high in terms of quality and
usefulness for valuation relative to other countries.10
This
conclusion is based on research using several approaches. First,
some researchers have examined the correlation between
accounting information and stock price, based on the notion that if
accounting data are highly correlated with share prices and
movements in share prices, then the data better capture economic
reality." For example, Ball et al. examine the relation between
annual earnings and returns for samples of firms from common
law countries (the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and
Australia) and civil law countries (France, Germany, and Japan) to
test the timeliness of reported earnings. 2 Overall, they find that
common law countries tend to report accounting data that are more
highly-correlated with returns, suggesting that their earnings are a
timelier source of information. 3 Further, among the common law
countries, the United States and Canada rank near the top.' 4
Ball, et al. investigate the source of the added timeliness by
comparing the relation between accounting information and stock
price for good and bad news. 5 They argue that managers have
natural incentives to disclose good news voluntarily, but that
10 Ball et al., supra note 2, at 2; Land & Lang, supra note 1; Leuz, Christian, et al.,
supra note 2 (manuscript at 3-4, on file with authors).
11 Ball et al., supra note 2, at 2-3.
12 Id. at 17.
13 Id.
14 Id.

15 Id. at 23.
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differences in accounting requirements, litigation exposure and
enforcement affect managers' willingness to disclose bad news. 6
In particular, their results indicate that the primary difference
between common and civil law countries is in the timely
recognition of bad news, with losses recognized in a more timely
manner in common law countries. 7 Again, the United States
ranks near the top of the common law countries in terms of early
recognition of bad news, probably reflecting the effects of
litigation exposure, and accounting standards on issues like asset
impairment that encourage timely loss recognition. 8
Their results on cash flows are also interesting. While it may
seem tempting to argue that cash flows are more informative than
earnings because of the management discretion inherent in
accruals, their paper also analyzes the issue of the informativeness
of operating cash flows across countries. '9 The basic result is that,
across all countries, accounting earnings are significantly more
informative to valuation than cash flows.2" More importantly, the
informativeness added by accruals is generally greater in common
law countries than in other countries. 2' Again, the United States
ranks near the top suggesting that, despite concerns about the
discretion inherent in accruals, managers generally make
assumptions that enhance the informativeness of the resulting
accounting data.
The basic message from Ball et al. is echoed in Leuz et al.
using a different approach.23 Leuz focuses more directly on
differences in the extent of earnings management across
countries.24 For example, the tendency of mangers to use their
discretion in managing earnings to smooth earnings is a concern
everywhere, including the United States. For example, former
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chairman, Arthur
16

Id. at 22-23.

17 Id.

at 23.

8 Id.
19 Id. at 38.
20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23 Leuz et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 23-24, on file with authors).
24

Id. (manuscript at 1-2, on file with authors).
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Levitt, noted the use of "cookie jar reserves" to smooth earnings
by shifting income from good years to bad years, thereby reducing
the informativeness of earnings.25
Leuz compares the tendency to manage earnings across thirtyone countries using a variety of measures of earnings management
and discretion.26 Supporting the Ball conclusions, Leuz finds that,
despite (or perhaps because of) SEC concerns about earnings
management, U.S. firms consistently rank near the bottom (least
earnings management) across a range of measures. 27 It is
instructive to consider the specific measures they use. First, they
examine the variability of operating income relative to the
variability of cash flows. 28 The reasoning behind this measure is
that, if managers use discretionary accruals to smooth variability
in reported income, then operating income will be smoother than
cash flows. Closely related, they consider the correlation between
changes in accruals and changes in cash flows, arguing that if
managers use their discretion to manage earnings they will use
positive accruals to offset poor cash flow results. 29 Third, they
examine the magnitude of overall accruals by comparing the
The
absolute value of accruals to cash from operations.30
advantage of this measure is that it does not rely on predictions
about the likely direction of discretionary accruals but, rather,
measures the overall quantity. Finally, they consider the frequency
of small profits relative to small losses.3' The notion here is that,
in cases in which "unmanaged" earnings would have resulted in a
small loss, firms engaging in earnings management will use their
discretion to find a way to report a small profit.
For each measure considered, Leuz et al. find that the United
States ranks near the bottom in terms of earnings management
25 SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Remarks at the NYU Center for Law and
Business, "The 'Numbers Game"' (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/speecharchive/ 1998/spch220.txt (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
26 Leuz, et al. supra note 2 (manuscript at 28, on file with authors).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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(i.e., less evidence of earnings management). 2 Further, they
create an aggregate measure of earnings quality by combining the
scores on their four earnings management measures.33 On that
basis, the results are particularly striking: of thirty-one countries
for which data are available, the United States has less evidence of
earnings management than any other country. 4 That is not to say
there is no evidence of earnings management in the United States,
but that the evidence is less pronounced in the United States than
in any other major economy.
Overall, the results from these papers, and 'others in the
comparative literature, suggest that the United States generally
ranks high relative to other countries based on empirical measures
of accounting quality.
Cross-Listing
Although indirect, related research comes from the literature
on the benefits of cross-listing. Cross-listing on U.S. exchanges is
interesting because it entails added regulatory requirements in
terms of filings with the SEC and reconciliation of net income and
shareholders' equity to U.S. General Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP).35
While added requirements might be
expected to reduce the attraction of U.S. listing, since other
markets typically do not impose such strict requirements, the
United States has been successful in attracting listings. 6
Coffee surveys the cross-listing literature and argues that the
evidence is most consistent with the notion that cross-listing
serves a bonding role, constraining firms to more transparent
reporting.37 As evidence, he cites Miller, who finds that firms that
cross listed on U.S. markets experienced an increase in share price
around the listing announcement.3" Even more striking is the
finding that the reaction is stronger the more fully a firm commits

32
33

Id.
ld.

34 Id.
35 Coffee, supra note 3, at 28-30.
36

Id. at 20.

37

Id. at 1-87.
Miller, supra note 3.

38
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to the U.S. regulatory structure. 39 For example, firms that listed on
the NYSE or Nasdaq (and hence were required to file with the
SEC and reconcile net income and shareholders' equity to U.S.
GAAP) enjoyed a larger stock price response than those that opted
to trade on the over-the-counter market, which, until recently, did
not require reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. 40 Firms with private
placements under Rule 144A and trading on PORTAL (which
have the fewest regulatory requirements) did not experience
positive returns. 4' As a consequence, it appears that investors give
greater credibility to firms that choose to list on the U.S. market.
Consistent with that conclusion, Lang, et al. examine the types
of firms that are attracted to U.S. listing.42 Their evidence
indicates that firms choosing to list on U.S. exchanges tend to be
those with the most transparent reporting even in their home
markets, suggesting that the U.S. listing requirements may serve to
screen out firms that are less willing to be forthcoming with the
market.43 That conclusion does not hold for firms that cross-list on
non-U.S. exchanges or on the U.S. over-the-counter market where
the regulatory environment is less demanding.44 Further, their
results suggest two related explanations for the findings. First,
firms that self-select into cross-listing tend to be those that have a
history of transparency, and therefore view the requirements
associated with U.S. listing as less onerous. 5 Second, firms
improve the quality of even their home financial statements
following cross listing.46
Taken with the results in the previous section on the
association between accounting information and stock prices,
these results suggest that investors and managers view the United
States as a particularly demanding regulatory environment in
which to list. Further, the results suggest that they benefit from
the increased transparency.
39 Id. at 114.
40

Id.

41 Id.
42

Lang et al., supra note 3.

43 Id. at 31.
44

Id. at 34.

45 Id. at 33.
46

Id. at 32.
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Comparisons over Time
Of course, the preceding literature is based on data over long
sample periods. It is possible that U.S. financial reporting was
once effective, but has deteriorated over time. While that
possibility cannot be dismissed entirely, it seems unlikely for
several reasons. First, the literature comparing evidence of
earnings quality over time is mixed at best. 47 Papers such as
Landsman and Maydew, for example, examine the stock market
reaction to earnings announcements over the last thirty years for
evidence that earnings have become less informative or timely. 8
The paper finds little general evidence of deterioration in the
informative nature of earnings announcements over time.4 9 If
anything, their evidence indicates that the stock market reaction to
earnings announcements has increased over time, suggesting that
accounting earnings remain a timely and useful source of
information."
In an international setting, Land and Lang compare earnings
management across countries over time.5 In particular, they focus
on the correlation between cash flows and accruals to examine
cross-country differences in earnings management and whether
earnings smoothing has become more prevalent. 2 Their evidence
suggests that the level of U.S. earnings smoothing has remained
approximately constant over time.53 While there is evidence of a
reduction in earnings management in other countries, they find
that earnings smoothing in the United States remains modest
relative to other countries, a finding consistent with the results in
Leuz, et al.54
While the preceding evidence fails to show a systematic shift
in the quality of U.S. financial reporting over time, it is still
possible that the deterioration has occurred so suddenly that it has

47
48

Landsman & Maydew, supra note 4.
Id.

49 Id.
50

at 804.

Id.

51 Land & Lang, supra note 2, at 115.
52 Id. at 130.
53

Id.

54 Id.; Leuz et al., supra note 2.
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gone undetected in tests that focus on longer time periods.
However, that possibility seems unlikely for several reasons.
First, it is not clear that there have been major changes in U.S.
accounting in the last few years that would cause a sudden drop in
the quality of reporting. Most explanations typically associated
with the alleged drop in reporting quality are more likely to have
developed gradually and should therefore be reflected in the
studies which examine changes over time. For example, while it
is true the volume and detail of accounting standards have
increased, that has been more of a gradual trend and should be
reflected over longer periods. Similarly, while it is alleged that
auditors have become more reliant on non-audit revenues, that too
has probably been a gradual trend so its effects should be reflected
in the data. As a result, it is difficult to think of significant
changes that would predict a dramatic shift in accounting quality.
Discussion
Why, if financial reporting works well, do a disproportionate
share of financial reporting disasters appear to occur in the United
States? I believe there are several answers. First, paradoxically,
the United States may attract the very types of firms that are more
likely to fail. In particular, industries with high natural levels of
risk and information asymmetry between managers and investors
are more likely to be forced to seek out markets with the most
credibility to raise capital. For example, it is striking that startup
high technology firms typically choose the U.S. markets on which
to list. While certainty it is not possible, one potential explanation
is that those firms are attracted to the U.S. markets because they
are informationally better developed, and investors are therefore
likely to be most comfortable with their credibility.55 To the
extent that the U.S. market attracts riskier firms, there will
naturally be more failures. However, that is not to say that the
failures reflect a poor U.S. reporting environment.
Also, a natural consequence of better monitoring is that
violations are detected earlier. As a result, the preponderance of
scandals in the U.S. market may reflect the attention paid to

55 While I am not aware of direct evidence on this, Pagano, et al. find that
European firms cross-listing into the US market (as opposed to European markets) are
more likely to be high-growth, technology firms. Pagano et al., supra note 3, at 2651.
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attestation and compliance. For example, The Economist quotes
Liesel Knorr, Secretary-General of the German Accounting
Standards Committee as saying, while discussing German
accounting, "there is quite a bit of small-time cheating and there
might be big cheating as well." 6 The Economist goes on to add,
"because nobody checks, she says, you cannot tell."" Closely
related, the United States lacks the kind of long-term relationship
investing seen in other countries. As a result, firms with large
losses are allowed to fail, and the financial reporting is designed to
report the losses immediately rather than allowing them to be
smoothed out over time. Even a disaster like Enron might have
been averted (although at potentially very high cost) had
relationship investors been present who were willing to continue
to provide capital and had the financial reporting system allowed
Enron to continue to hide its losses.
Conclusions
Clearly, recent scandals raise important issues with respect to
U.S. financial reporting. My goal in this paper is simply to
caution against overreaction. Based on the existing research
evidence, it seems difficult to make a compelling case that U.S.
reporting is fundamentally flawed. Subject to its inherent
limitations, the existing empirical evidence suggests that the U.S.
financial reporting system has performed well relative to other
systems. 8 Further, despite claims to the contrary, there is not
clear evidence that the quality of U.S. financial reporting has
declined significantly over time. 9
That having been said, recent scandals do clearly indicate
important areas of potential improvement. For example, Enron
highlights difficult issues related to special purpose entities and
the potential for auditor conflicts of interest created by demand for
non-auditing services. However, the general track record of U.S.
financial reporting suggests that a response focusing on specific
56 Holier Than Thou, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2003, at 69.
57 Id.

58 Leuz et al., supra note 2, at 1; Land & Lang, supra note 2, at 133; Ball et al.,
supra note 2, at 1.

59 Landsman & Maydew, supra note 4 at 797-808; Land & Lang, supra note 2 at
115-133.
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issues rather than fundamental changes may be merited. Overall,
there is little evidence that any other existing system would give a
better result.
How will the recent scandals affect the credibility of U.S.
reporting going forward?
While it is too early to judge
definitively, it is certainly possible that the scandals may have a
positive long-term effect. In particular, the initial response to the
issues raised by Enron has been fairly dramatic.6 ° Certainly the
collapse of Enron's auditor, indictment of key executives, and
recent legislative action suggest that the issues have been taken
quite seriously. 6' Even though, as noted earlier, other countries
face similar issues, the international response has been muted
relative to the United States. 62 Assuming that the momentum
continues, including significant penalties against individuals in the
case, it seems plausible that the long-term credibility of the system
may even be enhanced in the aftermath of Enron.

60 Holier Than Thou, supra note 56.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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